From Cyberattacks to Carbon and Air-Pollutant Emissions: A Systematic Review of Operational Pathways in Power Systems
IEEE Access · 2026 · 14 · 164442-164468
DOI: 10.1109/access.2026.3743457 ↗Kurz gefasst
Systematische Übersicht in der Zeitschrift IEEE Access, 2026. Verfasst von Jimmy Cordova-Villagomez und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 157 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Decanato de Investigación from the Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The increasing digitalization of modern power systems has improved operational efficiency, controllability, and the integration of distributed energy resources, while simultaneously expanding the cyberattack surface across critical operational functions. Although the reliability and economic consequences of cyberattacks have been extensively investigated, their potential environmental implications remain insufficiently understood. This systematic literature review examines the conditions under which cyber-induced operational disturbances may influence greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollutants by altering unit commitment, security-constrained economic dispatch, reserve activation, renewable curtailment, corrective redispatch, and distributed energy resource operation. A total of 157 studies were synthesized into nine analytical subtopics covering cyberattack mechanisms, operational responses, resilient control strategies, and emissions assessment methodologies. The review shows that cyberattacks do not inherently increase emissions; rather, environmental impacts arise when attacks modify the operating state of the power system, leading to changes in the marginal generation mix and the deployment of higher-emission resources during normal or emergency operations. Based on this evidence, an integrated cyberattack-to-emissions framework is proposed to connect cyber-induced operational changes with established emissions assessment methods. An illustrative IEEE 30-bus case study demonstrates the framework’s applicability by showing how representative cyberattack scenarios can produce measurable changes in system emissions through generation redispatch and renewable curtailment. The proposed framework provides a foundation for incorporating environmental performance into cyber-resilience assessment and supports future research toward more sustainable and secure power system operation.
Förderung
- Decanato de Investigación from the Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral
Zitieren
APA
Cordova-Villagomez, J., Alvarez-Alvarado, M. S., & Ramirez, A. D. (2026). From Cyberattacks to Carbon and Air-Pollutant Emissions: A Systematic Review of Operational Pathways in Power Systems. IEEE Access, 14, 164442-164468. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3743457
Vancouver
Cordova-Villagomez J, Alvarez-Alvarado MS, Ramirez AD. From Cyberattacks to Carbon and Air-Pollutant Emissions: A Systematic Review of Operational Pathways in Power Systems. IEEE Access. 2026;14:164442-164468. doi:10.1109/access.2026.3743457
BibTeX
@article{CordovaVillagomez2026,
author = {Cordova-Villagomez, Jimmy and Alvarez-Alvarado, Manuel S. and Ramirez, Angel D.},
title = {From Cyberattacks to Carbon and Air-Pollutant Emissions: A Systematic Review of Operational Pathways in Power Systems},
journal = {IEEE Access},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
pages = {164442--164468},
doi = {10.1109/access.2026.3743457}
}
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