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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Analysis of the Quid Pro Quo Mechanism With Correlated Players

J. Doncel, A. Cerezo, A. Santos, A. Fernández Anta

IEEE Access · 2026 · 14 · 50023-50034

DOI: 10.1109/access.2026.3678786 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Access, 2026. Verfasst von J. Doncel und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 17 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Department of Science, University and Innovation from the Basque Government to the MATHMODE Group, Spanish Ministry of Science and Universities.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We address the problem of allocating a finite set of heterogeneous resources among multiple players with individual preferences. Each player assigns a valuation to every resource, and its utility is defined as the sum of the valuations of the resources it receives. The goal is to design a mechanism that simultaneously i) maximizes the total social welfare, and ii) guarantees fairness in terms of both the proportion of resources and the utilities obtained by the players. Existing work on fair division and Quid Pro Quo (QPQ) mechanisms either focuses on welfare maximization without fairness guarantees or ensures fairness without providing structural or uniqueness results for the optimal allocation rule; our work closes this gap. We study the two-player QPQ setting. Using an analytical characterization of the optimal allocation rule, we prove that, for any prescribed sharing of utilities and resources and any joint density of player preferences, the boundary separating the allocations of the two players must be linear. Under independence of the players’ preferences, we further establish existence and uniqueness of the optimal linear rule. We then show that the identity rule (a linear rule with slope one and zero intercept) is always a critical point of the welfare-maximization problem and identify conditions under which it satisfies both fairness constraints. Numerical experiments suggest that the theoretical findings extend to more complex situations. The main results of this work provide theoretical foundations for designing fair and efficient resource-allocation rules in practical systems where users compete for limited shared resources.

Förderung

  • Department of Science, University and Innovation from the Basque Government to the MATHMODE Group
  • Spanish Ministry of Science and Universities

Zitieren

APA

Doncel, J., Cerezo, A., Santos, A., & Anta, A. F. (2026). Analysis of the Quid Pro Quo Mechanism With Correlated Players. IEEE Access, 14, 50023-50034. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3678786

Vancouver

Doncel J, Cerezo A, Santos A, Anta AF. Analysis of the Quid Pro Quo Mechanism With Correlated Players. IEEE Access. 2026;14:50023-50034. doi:10.1109/access.2026.3678786

BibTeX
@article{Doncel2026,
  author = {Doncel, J. and Cerezo, A. and Santos, A. and Anta, A. Fernández},
  title = {Analysis of the Quid Pro Quo Mechanism With Correlated Players},
  journal = {IEEE Access},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  pages = {50023--50034},
  doi = {10.1109/access.2026.3678786}
}
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