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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Leveraging Transformer Networks for Enhanced Detection of Hardware Trojans via Power Side-Channel Analysis

Ayman Elshenawy, Khalil Mohamed Abdelnaby, Abdurrahman A. Nasr, Mohamed Zaki

IEEE Access · 2026 · 14 · 107797-107812

DOI: 10.1109/access.2026.3670639 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Access, 2026. Verfasst von Ayman Elshenawy und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 76 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The proliferation of Hardware Trojans (HTs) poses a critical threat to the reliability and security of integrated circuits (ICs), particularly in safety and mission-critical domains. Conventional detection approaches either rely on destructive imaging or trusted golden chips, both of which are costly and limited in scalability. This study introduces a golden-chip-free, non-destructive framework for Hardware Trojan Detection (HTD) based on transformer architecture applied to Power Side-Channel (PSC) signals. The research contribution presents the first systematic performance comparison between decoder-only (GPT-like) and encoder-only (BERT-like) models, as well as full encoder–decoder transformer models, for time-series PSC analysis. To adapt these models to the hardware security domain, side-channel traces are normalized, reduced via principal component analysis, and embedded with positional encodings to preserve temporal structure. The framework is evaluated on the publicly available Trojan Power & EM Side-Channel dataset using 10-fold cross-validation. Results show that GPT-based and BERT-based models achieve 66.32% and 79.41% accuracy, respectively. While the full transformer network significantly outperforms them with 92.43% accuracy, 92.44% precision, 92.43% recall, and an F1-score of 92.31%. These findings demonstrate the potential of attention-based architectures to capture subtle variations in PSC signals without requiring a golden reference chip. The study contributes a reproducible and comparative benchmark for transformer-based HTD, offering a scalable pathway toward more robust and interpretable hardware security solutions.

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APA

Elshenawy, A., Abdelnaby, K. M., Nasr, A. A., & Zaki, M. (2026). Leveraging Transformer Networks for Enhanced Detection of Hardware Trojans via Power Side-Channel Analysis. IEEE Access, 14, 107797-107812. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3670639

Vancouver

Elshenawy A, Abdelnaby KM, Nasr AA, Zaki M. Leveraging Transformer Networks for Enhanced Detection of Hardware Trojans via Power Side-Channel Analysis. IEEE Access. 2026;14:107797-107812. doi:10.1109/access.2026.3670639

BibTeX
@article{Elshenawy2026,
  author = {Elshenawy, Ayman and Abdelnaby, Khalil Mohamed and Nasr, Abdurrahman A. and Zaki, Mohamed},
  title = {Leveraging Transformer Networks for Enhanced Detection of Hardware Trojans via Power Side-Channel Analysis},
  journal = {IEEE Access},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  pages = {107797--107812},
  doi = {10.1109/access.2026.3670639}
}
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