Zealots lower coordination barriers but undermine cooperation in multiplayer games
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · 19.08.2026 · 293 (2077)
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2026.0923 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, online erschienen am 19.08.2026. Verfasst von Yuting Dong und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics , Kunming, Yunnan 650221, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Major Program of the National Fund of Philosophy and Social Science of China, JSPS KAKENHI.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
How can a small group of committed cooperators shape collective outcomes in social dilemmas? Previous studies have shown that zealots—individuals who always cooperate—can promote cooperation in prisoner's dilemmas. Yet real-world cooperation also involves multiplayer coordination problems, where their role remains less understood. Here, we examine the role of zealots in N-person stag-hunt games in both finite and infinite, well-mixed populations. We show that a minority of zealots facilitates the emergence of cooperation by lowering the barrier to coordination, but at the cost of reducing the equilibrium level of cooperation. More strikingly, zealots can create two new attractors in infinite populations—full cooperation and stable coexistence—that extend beyond the classical equilibrium of full defection or bistability between defection and cooperation (or coexistence). In finite populations, this dual effect largely persists as population size approaches infinity; otherwise, zealots either matter little or consistently enhance cooperation. Together, these findings revise the conventional view that zealots enhance cooperation in well-mixed populations, revealing instead their dual role in multiplayer coordination dilemmas. This nuanced influence may also shape broader collective problems, from collective-risk dilemmas to the emergence of social conventions.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics , Kunming, Yunnan 650221, People's Republic of China.
- Independent Researcher , Beijing 100080, People's Republic of China.
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University , Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
- School of Statistics and Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Research Institute of Data Science, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance , Shanghai 201209, People's Republic of China.
ORCID-Profile: Yuting Dong, Hao Guo, Chen Shen, Lei Shi
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Major Program of the National Fund of Philosophy and Social Science of China
- JSPS KAKENHI
Zitieren
APA
Dong, Y., Guo, H., Shen, C., & Shi, L. (2026). Zealots lower coordination barriers but undermine cooperation in multiplayer games. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 293(2077). https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2026.0923
Vancouver
Dong Y, Guo H, Shen C, Shi L. Zealots lower coordination barriers but undermine cooperation in multiplayer games. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2026;293(2077). doi:10.1098/rspb.2026.0923
BibTeX
@article{Dong2026,
author = {Dong, Yuting and Guo, Hao and Shen, Chen and Shi, Lei},
title = {Zealots lower coordination barriers but undermine cooperation in multiplayer games},
journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},
year = {2026},
volume = {293},
number = {2077},
doi = {10.1098/rspb.2026.0923}
}
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