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Invited Reply: Modal reasoning in non-human animals: possible ways forward

Jan M Engelmann iD, Christoph J Völter iD, Mariel K Goddu, Josep Call, Esther Herrmann, Hannes Rakoczy

Biology Letters · 2024

DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2024.0080 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Biology Letters, 2024. Verfasst von Jan M Engelmann und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley , Berkeley, CA 94720-1650, USA. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Thinking, Behavior, Animal. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We thank Redshaw & Suddendorf [1] for their thoughtful comments on our recent study.We agree that there is no straightforward litmus test of the ability to represent alternative possibilities in non-verbal populations such as chimpanzees.Each individual task is more or less convincing, and most, if not all, tasks are open to potential lower-level alternative interpretations.Redshaw & Suddendorf [2] developed the 'forked-tube task' (based on earlier work by Robinson et al. and Beck et al. [3,4]) to investigate modal thought in non-human primates.This task poses two main cognitive challenges: (i) subjects must represent alternative possibilities (i.e.realize that the reward may emerge from the left tube or the right tube) and (ii) subjects must figure out how to act adaptively in light of these possibilities (i.e.determine that covering both tube openings guarantees success).Given these two challenges, it is possible that non-human primates' failure in Redshaw & Suddendorf's original 'forked-tube task' was not owing to problems with challenge 1 (which is dependent on modal cognition), but rather owing to problems with solving challenge 2 (which is not dependent on modal cognition; for evidence along these lines with chimpanzees and children, see [5,6]).To test the hypothesis that minimizing task demands would improve chimpanzees' performance, we developed an alternative experimental approach that did not require subjects to invent a novel, ecologically irrelevant action-thereby minimizing the demands associated with challenge 2 (see [5,7,8] for similar approaches in studies with human children).Specifically, we introduced a familiarization phase during which subjects learned to produce the appropriate behavioural response.Using this approach, we found evidence for modal reasoning in chimpanzees [9].Of course, what applies to other tasks with non-verbal populations also applies to our task: leaner interpretations-such as the ones pointed out by Redshaw & Suddendorf [1]-are available.For example, we do agree that one potential confound in our experimental setup is that two tubes were present in the test condition (potentially drawing attention to both platforms), whereas only one tube was present in the control condition.This was not the case, however, in our earlier experimental setup, which also provided evidence for modal reasoning in chimpanzees [10].This earlier study also suggests that chimpanzees' behaviour is not explainable in terms of representing an AND relation-another suggestion made by Redshaw & Suddendorf-as chimpanzees stopped searching when they found a reward in the first box.Instead of focusing on the details of these alternative interpretations, we will use

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

ThinkingBehavior, AnimalAnimals

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

animalsforwardnon-humanpossiblereasonings

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley , Berkeley, CA 94720-1650, USA.
  • Department of Comparative Cultural Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology , Leipzig 04103, Germany.
  • Comparative Cognition, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna, University of Vienna , Vienna 1210, Austria.
  • Department of Psychology, Harvard University , Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
  • School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews , St Andrews KY16 9AJ, UK.
  • Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth , Portsmouth PO1 2UP, UK.

ORCID-Profile: Jan M Engelmann, Christoph J Völter

Zitieren

APA

Engelmann, J. M., Völter, C. J., Goddu, M. K., Call, J., Herrmann, E., & Rakoczy, H. (2024). Invited Reply: Modal reasoning in non-human animals: possible ways forward. Biology Letters. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2024.0080

Vancouver

Engelmann JM, Völter CJ, Goddu MK, Call J, Herrmann E, Rakoczy H. Invited Reply: Modal reasoning in non-human animals: possible ways forward. Biology Letters. 2024. doi:10.1098/rsbl.2024.0080

BibTeX
@article{Engelmann2024,
  author = {Engelmann, Jan M and Völter, Christoph J and Goddu, Mariel K and Call, Josep and Herrmann, Esther and Rakoczy, Hannes},
  title = {Invited Reply: Modal reasoning in non-human animals: possible ways forward},
  journal = {Biology Letters},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1098/rsbl.2024.0080}
}
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