On Sam Brewitt-Taylor’s ‘The Invention of a “Secular Society”? Christianity and the Sudden Appearance of Secularization Discourses in the British National Media, 1961-4’ (2013)
Modern British History · 2024
DOI: 10.1093/tcbh/hwae012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Modern British History, 2024. Verfasst von Alex Hill. Beteiligte Einrichtung: University College London, UK. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
‘At some point between 1961 and 1964’, Sam Brewitt-Taylor observed in an article that won the Duncan Tanner Prize in 2012, ‘the received wisdom about British religiosity abruptly changed’.1 In the first half of the twentieth century, Britain thought of itself as a part of ‘Christian civilisation’; however, in the early 1960s, it reimagined itself as a ‘modern’, ‘secular society’.2 Contemporary commentators understood this to mean a society in which ‘atheists would soon outnumber supernaturalists’.3 (This was more than a little hasty at a time when professed believers outnumbered professed non-believers eight to one.)4 Perhaps, surprisingly, the key agents of this radical, secular re-imagining of Britain were liberal Christian thinkers like John Robinson.5 Their intervention in the national media in the early 1960s ruptured Christianity’s cultural hegemony. In time, Brewitt-Taylor argues that this elite re-imagination of British religiosity would have consequences for Britons’ religious beliefs. After all, people had assumed for centuries that ‘being Christian was the default position for a British person’.6 With that assumption now gone, individuals began to re-evaluate their own beliefs. Brewitt-Taylor himself has been extending these arguments ever since he sketched them in Twentieth Century British History, and other scholars have developed them too. I want to highlight two implications of Brewitt-Taylor’s work that are already guiding further research. First, his is a ‘radically anti-teleological strategy’ for making sense of moral change in modern Britain.7 It recognizes that Britons in the post-war period ‘did not fit a twenty-first-century progressive/conservative dichotomy, but were instead radical in some dimensions but not in others’.8 As such, historians should not think of ‘progressive’ moral change as the neat outcome of a pitched battle against reactionaries, but instead understand it as the messier product of different skirmishes fought by shifting coalitions.9 They should also keep an eye out for the Christian figures and discourses that shifted in and out of these coalitions over time. Laura Monica Ramsay’s work, for example, has shown that bishops in the House of Lords played an important role in shaping the 1967 Sexual Offences Act.10 Alana Harris has examined the work of Dr Anne Bieżanek who established one of the world’s first Catholic birth control clinics in Wallasey, Merseyside.11 Christianity’s role in progressive coalitions against racism and global poverty has, to date, been relatively underexplored.12 Its place in mid-century cultures of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy has also, I suspect, been obscured by contemporary teleologies.13 Secondly, although Brewitt-Taylor’s focus is on cultural elites mostly in London, he encourages us to research the regional working out of ‘secularisation’.14 Outside the national media, we are told, ‘the enactment of “secularisation” occurred much more slowly, as different localities and personalities adapted to living within the new cultural paradigm’.15 In the late-twentieth century, Christian figures could adopt a defensive position as Charlie Lynch finds among the Presbyterians of Falkirk.16 But they could also embrace being part of a ‘new, multi-faith form of civil religion’ as Alister Chapman finds in his work on Derby.17 Clearly, there was a great deal of local variation in the transition to a ‘secular society’, with migration playing a crucial role in determining that trajectory. And that brings us back to London where the churches have started to grow again. Some have described this as a process of ‘desecularisation from below’.18 Importantly, none of this disproves Brewitt-Taylor’s central argument. In fact, his key point—that a new meta-narrative of ‘secularisation’ emerged in the 1960s—can help contextualize these contemporary religious subjectivities. As Anna Strhan’s work on evangelical Londoners has shown, believing oneself to be operating in a secular context is an important framework for contemporary believers. It shapes the complex web of faith, anxiety, and embarrassment they experience when operating in a culture that they believe sees them as ‘intolerant’ and ‘out-of-date’.19 This body of work still has much to offer the historian of modern Britain. I would like to thank Chris Hilliard for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- University College London, UK.
ORCID-Profile: Alex Hill
Zitieren
APA
Hill, A. (2024). On Sam Brewitt-Taylor’s ‘The Invention of a “Secular Society”? Christianity and the Sudden Appearance of Secularization Discourses in the British National Media, 1961-4’ (2013). Modern British History. https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwae012
Vancouver
Hill A. On Sam Brewitt-Taylor’s ‘The Invention of a “Secular Society”? Christianity and the Sudden Appearance of Secularization Discourses in the British National Media, 1961-4’ (2013). Modern British History. 2024. doi:10.1093/tcbh/hwae012
BibTeX
@article{Hill2024,
author = {Hill, Alex},
title = {On Sam Brewitt-Taylor’s ‘The Invention of a “Secular Society”? Christianity and the Sudden Appearance of Secularization Discourses in the British National Media, 1961-4’ (2013)},
journal = {Modern British History},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.1093/tcbh/hwae012}
}
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