Government Guarantees and Dynamic Debt Runs
Review of Finance · 13.11.2026
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfag055 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 13.11.2026. Verfasst von Jacopo Magnani und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study quantifies the impact of public guarantees on the stability of bank wholesale funding. We study the Chinese market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs) around the first bank failure in two decades, the Baoshang event, which struck investors’ belief in government guarantees on wholesale bank debt. We document a sharp increase in NCD spreads, issuance failures, and runs, with weaker banks becoming more exposed to rollover risk after the event. Using a model of dynamic debt runs, we estimate that the perceived guarantee fell from 54% of creditor losses before the event to approximately zero after the event. The decline is largest for small banks, low-rated banks, and rural commercial banks. Our structural model also allows us to compare alternative policies aimed at stabilizing creditors’ willingness to roll over short-term debt.
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APA
Magnani, J., & Wang, Y. (2026). Government Guarantees and Dynamic Debt Runs. Review of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfag055
Vancouver
Magnani J, Wang Y. Government Guarantees and Dynamic Debt Runs. Review of Finance. 2026. doi:10.1093/rof/rfag055
BibTeX
@article{Magnani2026,
author = {Magnani, Jacopo and Wang, Yabin},
title = {Government Guarantees and Dynamic Debt Runs},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfag055}
}
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