Stress tests by an informed regulator
Review of Finance · 01.11.2026 · 30 (6) · 1855-1893
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfag020 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 15.06.2026. Verfasst von Markus Parlasca. Die Arbeit nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Economic and Social Research Council UK.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article studies the disclosure of stress test results by a regulator who is privately informed about bank health when she chooses the stress scenario. I show that the regulator’s choice of the stress scenario depends on how heterogeneous health is across banks. There can be fewer runs than under transparency. However, there are more runs than when the regulator chooses the scenario before becoming informed, highlighting a time-inconsistency problem. Moreover, disclosure can become a source of informational contagion, as changes in the health of one bank affect beliefs about other banks. The model explains the empirical puzzle that a bank’s share price can fall even though it passes the stress test.
Förderung
- Economic and Social Research Council UK
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APA
Parlasca, M. (2026). Stress tests by an informed regulator. Review of Finance, 30(6), 1855-1893. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfag020
Vancouver
Parlasca M. Stress tests by an informed regulator. Review of Finance. 2026;30(6):1855-1893. doi:10.1093/rof/rfag020
BibTeX
@article{Parlasca2026,
author = {Parlasca, Markus},
title = {Stress tests by an informed regulator},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {6},
pages = {1855--1893},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfag020}
}
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