Opacity, signaling, and bail-ins
Review of Finance · 01.11.2026 · 30 (6) · 2075-2103
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfag019 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 11.06.2026. Verfasst von Kentaro Asai und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 42 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Should banks be transparent during a bail-in? Banks suffering losses may bail-in creditors to optimally allocate resources between early and late withdrawers. However, if losses are private information, then bail-ins may signal asset quality. In the absence of signaling, banks can sell assets at a pooled price, effectively insuring creditors against asset risks. However, when bail-ins signal quality, banks may delay bail-ins and sell assets at higher prices than otherwise, but this incentive can trigger inefficient bank runs. To prevent such runs, banks should choose to be either fully transparent or entirely opaque, ensuring asset quality is not private information.
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APA
Asai, K., Grundy, B., & Izumi, R. (2026). Opacity, signaling, and bail-ins. Review of Finance, 30(6), 2075-2103. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfag019
Vancouver
Asai K, Grundy B, Izumi R. Opacity, signaling, and bail-ins. Review of Finance. 2026;30(6):2075-2103. doi:10.1093/rof/rfag019
BibTeX
@article{Asai2026,
author = {Asai, Kentaro and Grundy, Bruce and Izumi, Ryuichiro},
title = {Opacity, signaling, and bail-ins},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {6},
pages = {2075--2103},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfag019}
}
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