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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

The ring-fencing bonus

Irem Erten, Ioana Neamţu, John Thanassoulis

Review of Finance · 01.05.2026 · 30 (3) · 995-1028

DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaf076 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 14.12.2025. Verfasst von Irem Erten und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study the impact of ring-fencing on bank riskiness using short-term money markets. Ring-fencing is when the government restricts some banking activities to a subsidiary of the group whilst restricting intra-group transfers. Exploiting confidential data on sterling-denominated repo transactions, we document that banking groups subject to ring-fencing are perceived to be safer—repo investors lend to ring-fenced groups at lower rates—and that the safety perception is amplified during times of market stress. We show that ring-fenced groups also intermediate more cautiously. Our article suggests that structural reforms can create a “safe-haven” bank in the financial system.

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APA

Erten, I., Neamţu, I., & Thanassoulis, J. (2026). The ring-fencing bonus. Review of Finance, 30(3), 995-1028. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf076

Vancouver

Erten I, Neamţu I, Thanassoulis J. The ring-fencing bonus. Review of Finance. 2026;30(3):995-1028. doi:10.1093/rof/rfaf076

BibTeX
@article{Erten2026,
  author = {Erten, Irem and Neamţu, Ioana and Thanassoulis, John},
  title = {The ring-fencing bonus},
  journal = {Review of Finance},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  pages = {995--1028},
  doi = {10.1093/rof/rfaf076}
}
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