The value of guarantor monitoring: evidence from bond defaults in China
Review of Finance · 01.01.2026 · 30 (1) · 163-192
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaf067 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 08.12.2025. Verfasst von Haoyu Gao und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Using a bond–year panel dataset, we show that external credit guarantors can mitigate default risk in the corporate bond market, and the observed effects cannot be fully attributed to pre-issuance screening. Consistent with a monitoring channel, we explore the post-issuance dynamics and find that the risk-reduction effect of guarantees is significantly stronger when guarantors face greater risk exposure or when issuers experience post-issuance financial deterioration. We further demonstrate that guarantees act as substitutes for covenant-based monitoring and promote disciplined firm behavior: Guaranteed firms exhibit reduced risk-taking, reflected in lower levels of overinvestment and excessive leverage. Together, these findings underscore the delegated monitoring role of guarantors in mitigating agency conflicts between issuers and investors in public debt markets.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Gao, H., Huang, Y., & Mo, J. (2026). The value of guarantor monitoring: evidence from bond defaults in China. Review of Finance, 30(1), 163-192. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf067
Vancouver
Gao H, Huang Y, Mo J. The value of guarantor monitoring: evidence from bond defaults in China. Review of Finance. 2026;30(1):163-192. doi:10.1093/rof/rfaf067
BibTeX
@article{Gao2026,
author = {Gao, Haoyu and Huang, Yuting and Mo, Jingyuan},
title = {The value of guarantor monitoring: evidence from bond defaults in China},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {1},
pages = {163--192},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfaf067}
}
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