Competition and loan contracting
Review of Finance · 01.07.2026 · 30 (4) · 1187-1225
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaf054 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 08.12.2025. Verfasst von Xunhua Su und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 68 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A theoretical model of the borrower–lender relationship predicts that increased competitive threats lead to a reduction in loan covenant restrictiveness that is stronger for groups of borrowers who face constraints to their ability to raise external financing or compete in the product market. These predictions arise because competition impacts the dynamics of borrower performance so that lenders must trade off the benefit of controlling agency problems against a heightened cost of lost product market opportunities for the borrower, ultimately lowering the optimal use of covenants. We find strong empirical support for these predictions, highlighting an important role of competition for optimal financial contracting rooted in underlying agency problems.
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APA
Su, X., Cao, J., Kjenstad, E. C., & Zhang, X. (2026). Competition and loan contracting. Review of Finance, 30(4), 1187-1225. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf054
Vancouver
Su X, Cao J, Kjenstad EC, Zhang X. Competition and loan contracting. Review of Finance. 2026;30(4):1187-1225. doi:10.1093/rof/rfaf054
BibTeX
@article{Su2026,
author = {Su, Xunhua and Cao, Jin and Kjenstad, Einar C and Zhang, Xiaoyu},
title = {Competition and loan contracting},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {1187--1225},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfaf054}
}
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