Circuit breakers and market runs
Review of Finance · 01.11.2024 · 28 (6) · 1953-1989
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfae029 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 05.09.2024. Verfasst von Dion Bongaerts und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 67 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Traders may run on financial markets merely out of fear of future liquidity shocks. We present a model that shows that adequately calibrated circuit breakers can prevent such coordination failures by curbing excessive trading. It suggests a novel, forward-looking circuit breaker that becomes most restrictive in cases when expected welfare losses of inefficient market runs are largest. The probabilities of current and future liquidity shortages are important determinants for such welfare-optimized circuit breakers. We empirically illustrate how to calibrate these parameters. We also determine under which economic conditions circuit breakers damage welfare and should not be implemented.
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APA
Bongaerts, D., Luca, S. D. D., & Achter, M. V. (2024). Circuit breakers and market runs. Review of Finance, 28(6), 1953-1989. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae029
Vancouver
Bongaerts D, Luca SDD, Achter MV. Circuit breakers and market runs. Review of Finance. 2024;28(6):1953-1989. doi:10.1093/rof/rfae029
BibTeX
@article{Bongaerts2024,
author = {Bongaerts, Dion and Luca, Sarah D De and Achter, Mark Van},
title = {Circuit breakers and market runs},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {28},
number = {6},
pages = {1953--1989},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfae029}
}
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