Strategic borrowing from passive investors
Review of Finance · 01.09.2024 · 28 (5) · 1537-1573
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfae012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 15.04.2024. Verfasst von Darius Palia und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 17-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 71 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Whitcomb Center for Research in Financial Services, Rutgers University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We find that short sellers manage risks by strategically borrowing shares in stocks with significant ownership by passive investors. This practice increases securities lending demand for stocks with substantial passive ownership, resulting in improved price efficiency, higher lending fees, and increased short interest in these stocks. Consistent with the risk mitigation motive, these stocks show reduced risks of unexpected fee hikes and loan recall, longer loan durations, and attract more informed short sellers. These effects are particularly pronounced in hard-to-borrow stocks where short-sale constraints are binding. Our study suggests that passive investing helps alleviate short-sale constraints by reducing the risks associated with stock borrowing.
Förderung
- Whitcomb Center for Research in Financial Services
- Rutgers University
Zitieren
APA
Palia, D., & Sokolinski, S. (2024). Strategic borrowing from passive investors. Review of Finance, 28(5), 1537-1573. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae012
Vancouver
Palia D, Sokolinski S. Strategic borrowing from passive investors. Review of Finance. 2024;28(5):1537-1573. doi:10.1093/rof/rfae012
BibTeX
@article{Palia2024,
author = {Palia, Darius and Sokolinski, Stanislav},
title = {Strategic borrowing from passive investors},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {28},
number = {5},
pages = {1537--1573},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfae012}
}
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