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Stablecoin Runs and the Centralization of Arbitrage

Yiming Ma, Yao Zeng, Anthony Lee Zhang

The Review of Financial Studies · 03.09.2026

DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag072 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 03.09.2026. Verfasst von Yiming Ma und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 87 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Stablecoins are cryptoassets designed to be pegged to the dollar, but they are backed by imperfectly liquid USD assets. We show that stablecoins feature concentrated arbitrage: the largest issuer, Tether, allows only six agents in an average month to redeem stablecoins for cash. We argue that the issuers’ choice of arbitrage concentration reflects a trade-off: efficient arbitrage improves stablecoin price stability in secondary markets but amplifies run risks by reducing investors’ price impact from selling stablecoins. Our findings imply that policies designed to improve stablecoin price stability may have the unintended consequence of increasing stablecoin run risks.

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APA

Ma, Y., Zeng, Y., & Zhang, A. L. (2026). Stablecoin Runs and the Centralization of Arbitrage. The Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag072

Vancouver

Ma Y, Zeng Y, Zhang AL. Stablecoin Runs and the Centralization of Arbitrage. The Review of Financial Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhag072

BibTeX
@article{Ma2026,
  author = {Ma, Yiming and Zeng, Yao and Zhang, Anthony Lee},
  title = {Stablecoin Runs and the Centralization of Arbitrage},
  journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhag072}
}
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