Voting Choice
The Review of Financial Studies · 13.07.2026
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag065 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 13.07.2026. Verfasst von Andrey Malenko und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 72 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of fund investors. Recently, there is a shift toward “pass-through voting,” with funds offering investors a choice: delegate votes to the fund or vote themselves. We develop a framework to study the implications of voting choice. While it helps reflect heterogeneous investor preferences, it also shapes the informational content of the vote, and these forces can conflict. When interests are aligned, voting choice improves information aggregation and investor welfare. With preference heterogeneity or costly information, however, it can make investors worse off by weakening informed decision making and fund managers’ incentives to acquire information.
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APA
Malenko, A., & Malenko, N. (2026). Voting Choice. The Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag065
Vancouver
Malenko A, Malenko N. Voting Choice. The Review of Financial Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhag065
BibTeX
@article{Malenko2026,
author = {Malenko, Andrey and Malenko, Nadya},
title = {Voting Choice},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhag065}
}
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