Leaky Director Networks and Innovation Herding
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.01.2026 · 39 (1) · 158-197
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf048 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 15.07.2025. Verfasst von Felipe Cabezon und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We first document that, despite potential legal issues, overlapping directors are surprisingly prevalent among direct competitors. Using panel data regressions and plausibly exogenous shocks, we find that competing firms in markets with dense overlapping-director networks experience innovation herding, lose product differentiation, and, ultimately, perform poorly. Novel text-based network propagation tests of technologies show that intellectual property leakage plays a role as firms with dense overlapping director networks experience faster propagation of technologies to competitors. Our findings suggest a coordination problem where industry participants cannot stop rivals from earning small gains from leakage despite much larger industry-wide negative externalities.
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APA
Cabezon, F., & Hoberg, G. (2026). Leaky Director Networks and Innovation Herding. The Review of Financial Studies, 39(1), 158-197. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaf048
Vancouver
Cabezon F, Hoberg G. Leaky Director Networks and Innovation Herding. The Review of Financial Studies. 2026;39(1):158-197. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaf048
BibTeX
@article{Cabezon2026,
author = {Cabezon, Felipe and Hoberg, Gerard},
title = {Leaky Director Networks and Innovation Herding},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {39},
number = {1},
pages = {158--197},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhaf048}
}
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