Option Auctions
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.03.2026 · 39 (3) · 783-834
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf043 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 08.07.2025. Verfasst von Terrence Hendershott und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Wholesale market makers pay for retail options orders that must be executed on exchanges. Payment for order flow (PFOF) wholesalers compete via price improvement in exchange auctions. To attract retail orders, wholesalers run more auctions when their recent price improvement has been lower. However, auction price improvement lowers market maker revenues. Wholesalers earn revenues to pay PFOF in nonauction trades where their designated market maker status increases their execution priority. While some auctions produce substantial price improvement, most do not have multiple bidders offering meaningful price improvement. Overall, options market structure better promotes competition in auctions than in nonauctions.
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APA
Hendershott, T., Khan, S. A., & Riordan, R. (2026). Option Auctions. The Review of Financial Studies, 39(3), 783-834. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaf043
Vancouver
Hendershott T, Khan SA, Riordan R. Option Auctions. The Review of Financial Studies. 2026;39(3):783-834. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaf043
BibTeX
@article{Hendershott2026,
author = {Hendershott, Terrence and Khan, Saad Ali and Riordan, Ryan},
title = {Option Auctions},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {39},
number = {3},
pages = {783--834},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhaf043}
}
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