Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Competition
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.11.2026 · 39 (11) · 3450-3497
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf028 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 01.09.2025. Verfasst von Li He und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine how relative performance evaluation (RPE) affects industry competition—a question relevant for corporate boards interested in incentivizing executives. Using U.S. airline data, we estimate a dynamic game of competition between heterogeneous firms in an oligopolistic market, with managers incentivized by RPE contracts. While RPE can induce a firm to compete more intensely by smoothing compensation, it also amplifies a firm’s cost efficiency relative to its peers and can weaken competition from inefficient firms. The first effect dominates in small markets and the second in median-sized markets. RPE has little effect in large, highly profitable markets.
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APA
He, L., Whited, T. M., & Guo, R. (2026). Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Competition. The Review of Financial Studies, 39(11), 3450-3497. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaf028
Vancouver
He L, Whited TM, Guo R. Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Competition. The Review of Financial Studies. 2026;39(11):3450-3497. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaf028
BibTeX
@article{He2026,
author = {He, Li and Whited, Toni M and Guo, Ran},
title = {Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Competition},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {39},
number = {11},
pages = {3450--3497},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhaf028}
}
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