Short-Term Debt and Corporate Governance
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.06.2025 · 38 (6) · 1868-1919
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf018 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 25.03.2025. Verfasst von Paul Voss. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 76 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
According to existing theories, short-term creditors promote corporate governance by responding quickly to new information. I show that this very feature of short-term debt can also undermine corporate governance. Though moderate levels of short-term debt improve the efficacy of blockholder exit and increase blockholders’ incentives to engage with the firm, high levels of short-term debt impair governance. In particular, high levels of short-term debt render the threat of exit noncredible, make public engagements too risky, and undermine blockholders’ incentives to engage behind the scenes. I identify a challenge in the governance of firms that rely on short-term funding such as banks.
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APA
Voss, P. (2025). Short-Term Debt and Corporate Governance. The Review of Financial Studies, 38(6), 1868-1919. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaf018
Vancouver
Voss P. Short-Term Debt and Corporate Governance. The Review of Financial Studies. 2025;38(6):1868-1919. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaf018
BibTeX
@article{Voss2025,
author = {Voss, Paul},
title = {Short-Term Debt and Corporate Governance},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2025},
volume = {38},
number = {6},
pages = {1868--1919},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhaf018}
}
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