Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.05.2025 · 38 (5) · 1368-1418
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf007 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 24.01.2025. Verfasst von Viral V Acharya und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 67 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing contracts involve government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to agree not to expropriate, thus improving private sector incentives and project quality. The contract also reflects several other features prevalent in infrastructure financing in practice, among which are government coinvestment, tax subsidies, and development rights.
Zitieren
APA
Acharya, V. V., Parlatore, C., & Sundaresan, S. (2025). Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation. The Review of Financial Studies, 38(5), 1368-1418. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaf007
Vancouver
Acharya VV, Parlatore C, Sundaresan S. Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation. The Review of Financial Studies. 2025;38(5):1368-1418. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaf007
BibTeX
@article{Acharya2025,
author = {Acharya, Viral V and Parlatore, Cecilia and Sundaresan, Suresh},
title = {Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2025},
volume = {38},
number = {5},
pages = {1368--1418},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhaf007}
}
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