Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.12.2024 · 37 (12) · 3877-3931
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhae045 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 04.09.2024. Verfasst von Aiyesha Dey und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study how Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) affect firms’ engagement with shareholders. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using say-on-pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers ISS to review engagement activities. Firms receiving ISS treatment exhibit swift and substantive increases in extensive and intensive margins of engagement, especially when their boards have higher agency conflicts and directors are more likely to lose voting support from ISS. Increases in engagement persist over time, and shareholders appear to value the increased engagement. Collectively, we shed light on an unexplored channel through which ISS positively influences firms’ governance and information environments.
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APA
Dey, A., Starkweather, A., & White, J. T. (2024). Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement. The Review of Financial Studies, 37(12), 3877-3931. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae045
Vancouver
Dey A, Starkweather A, White JT. Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement. The Review of Financial Studies. 2024;37(12):3877-3931. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhae045
BibTeX
@article{Dey2024,
author = {Dey, Aiyesha and Starkweather, Austin and White, Joshua T},
title = {Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {37},
number = {12},
pages = {3877--3931},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhae045}
}
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