The Technical Default Spread
The Review of Financial Studies · 01.11.2024 · 37 (11) · 3386-3430
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhae042 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 09.09.2024. Verfasst von Emilio Bisetti und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 91 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.
Förderung
- General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Bisetti, E., Li, K., & Yu, J. (2024). The Technical Default Spread. The Review of Financial Studies, 37(11), 3386-3430. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae042
Vancouver
Bisetti E, Li K, Yu J. The Technical Default Spread. The Review of Financial Studies. 2024;37(11):3386-3430. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhae042
BibTeX
@article{Bisetti2024,
author = {Bisetti, Emilio and Li, Kai and Yu, Jun},
title = {The Technical Default Spread},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {37},
number = {11},
pages = {3386--3430},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhae042}
}
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