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Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth

Ofer Eldar, Jillian Grennan

The Review of Financial Studies · 19.01.2024 · 37 (2) · 549-590

DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad071 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 09.09.2023. Verfasst von Ofer Eldar und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 55-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 83 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

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APA

Eldar, O., & Grennan, J. (2024). Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth. The Review of Financial Studies, 37(2), 549-590. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad071

Vancouver

Eldar O, Grennan J. Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth. The Review of Financial Studies. 2024;37(2):549-590. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhad071

BibTeX
@article{Eldar2024,
  author = {Eldar, Ofer and Grennan, Jillian},
  title = {Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth},
  journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {37},
  number = {2},
  pages = {549--590},
  doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhad071}
}
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