The Partisanship of Financial Regulators
The Review of Financial Studies · 20.10.2023 · 36 (11) · 4373-4416
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad029 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 21.04.2023. Verfasst von Joseph Engelberg und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 43-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyze the partisanship of Commissioners at the SEC and Governors at the Federal Reserve Board. Using recent advances in machine learning, we identify partisan phrases in Congress, such as “red tape” and “climate change,” and observe their usage among regulators. Although the Fed has remained relatively nonpartisan throughout our sample period (1930–2019), we find that partisanship among SEC Commissioners rose to an all-time high during the 2010-2019 period, driven by more-partisan Commissioners replacing less-partisan ones. Partisanship at the SEC appears in both the language of new SEC rules and the voting behavior of SEC Commissioners. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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APA
Engelberg, J., Henriksson, M., Manela, A., & Williams, J. (2023). The Partisanship of Financial Regulators. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(11), 4373-4416. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad029
Vancouver
Engelberg J, Henriksson M, Manela A, Williams J. The Partisanship of Financial Regulators. The Review of Financial Studies. 2023;36(11):4373-4416. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhad029
BibTeX
@article{Engelberg2023,
author = {Engelberg, Joseph and Henriksson, Matthew and Manela, Asaf and Williams, Jared},
title = {The Partisanship of Financial Regulators},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {36},
number = {11},
pages = {4373--4416},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhad029}
}
EUVIMED