Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets
The Review of Financial Studies · 21.08.2023 · 36 (9) · 3643-3692
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad018 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 02.03.2023. Verfasst von Yan Xiong und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the observability of investors’ information-acquisition activities in financial markets. Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition: (1) the pricing effect, which arises from interactions between investors and the market maker and can encourage or discourage information acquisition, and (2) the competition effect, which concerns interactions among investors and always encourages information acquisition. We apply our theory to study voluntary and mandatory disclosures of corporate site visits. When the competition effect dominates, investors voluntarily disclose their visits. When the pricing effect dominates, mandatory disclosure is effective. Our analysis sheds novel light on Regulation Fair Disclosure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Förderung
- Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Zitieren
APA
Xiong, Y., & Yang, L. (2023). Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(9), 3643-3692. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad018
Vancouver
Xiong Y, Yang L. Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets. The Review of Financial Studies. 2023;36(9):3643-3692. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhad018
BibTeX
@article{Xiong2023,
author = {Xiong, Yan and Yang, Liyan},
title = {Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {36},
number = {9},
pages = {3643--3692},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhad018}
}
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