Rating Agency Fees: Pay to Play in Public Finance?
The Review of Financial Studies · 20.04.2023 · 36 (5) · 2004-2045
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac073 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 06.10.2022. Verfasst von Jess Cornaggia und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 79 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine the relationship between credit rating levels and rating agency fees in a public finance market in which rating agencies earn lower fees and face higher disclosure requirements relative to corporate bond and structured finance markets. Controlling for variation in the complexity of credit analysis at the issue level, we find evidence that rating agency conflicts of interest distort credit ratings in the municipal bond market. Unexpectedly expensive ratings are more likely downgraded, and inexpensive ratings are more likely upgraded. The relationship between credit ratings and rating agency fees is driven by issuers who lose access to AAA insurance.
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APA
Cornaggia, J., Cornaggia, K. J., & Israelsen, R. (2023). Rating Agency Fees: Pay to Play in Public Finance?. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(5), 2004-2045. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac073
Vancouver
Cornaggia J, Cornaggia KJ, Israelsen R. Rating Agency Fees: Pay to Play in Public Finance?. The Review of Financial Studies. 2023;36(5):2004-2045. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhac073
BibTeX
@article{Cornaggia2023,
author = {Cornaggia, Jess and Cornaggia, Kimberly J and Israelsen, Ryan},
title = {Rating Agency Fees: Pay to Play in Public Finance?},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {36},
number = {5},
pages = {2004--2045},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhac073}
}
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