Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth
The Review of Financial Studies · 20.04.2023 · 36 (5) · 1837-1888
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac070 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 21.09.2022. Verfasst von Eliezer M Fich und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 34-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 79 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A duty of loyalty prohibits fiduciaries from appropriating business opportunities from their companies. Starting in 2000, Delaware, followed by several other states, allowed boards to waive their duty. We show that public firms covered by waiver laws invest less in R&D, produce fewer and less valuable patents, and exhibit abnormally high inventor departures. Remaining innovation activities contribute less to firm value, a fact confirmed by the market reaction when firms reveal their curtailed internal growth opportunities by announcing acquisitions. Consistent with the laws’ intent to provide contracting flexibility to emerging firms, we find evidence of positive impacts for small firms. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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APA
Fich, E. M., Harford, J., & Tran, A. L. (2023). Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(5), 1837-1888. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac070
Vancouver
Fich EM, Harford J, Tran AL. Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth. The Review of Financial Studies. 2023;36(5):1837-1888. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhac070
BibTeX
@article{Fich2023,
author = {Fich, Eliezer M and Harford, Jarrad and Tran, Anh L},
title = {Disloyal Managers and Shareholders’ Wealth},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {36},
number = {5},
pages = {1837--1888},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhac070}
}
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