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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A Model of Enclosures: Coordination, Conflict, and Efficiency in the Transformation of Land Property Rights

Matthew J Baker, Jonathan Conning

Review of Economic Studies · 30.10.2026

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag118 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 30.10.2026. Verfasst von Matthew J Baker und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 82 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Economists and historians have long debated how open-access areas, frontier regions, and customary landholding regimes transformed into private property. This paper analyses decentralized enclosure processes using the theory of aggregative games, examining how population density, enclosure costs, potential productivity gains, and local governance capacity, including the power to demand compensation, jointly determine the mix of property regimes. Depending on these fundamentals, private decisions to enclose may be strategic complements or substitutes. Strategic complements generate tipping points and socially destructive property races, whereas strategic substitutes produce smoother transitions and may leave enclosure below the social optimum. While policies to strengthen customary governance or compensate displaced stakeholders can realign incentives, addressing one distortion while neglecting others can worsen welfare.

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APA

Baker, M. J., & Conning, J. (2026). A Model of Enclosures: Coordination, Conflict, and Efficiency in the Transformation of Land Property Rights. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag118

Vancouver

Baker MJ, Conning J. A Model of Enclosures: Coordination, Conflict, and Efficiency in the Transformation of Land Property Rights. Review of Economic Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/restud/rdag118

BibTeX
@article{Baker2026,
  author = {Baker, Matthew J and Conning, Jonathan},
  title = {A Model of Enclosures: Coordination, Conflict, and Efficiency in the Transformation of Land Property Rights},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdag118}
}
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