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Stockups, Stockouts, and the Role for Strategic Reserves

Brett Green, Cyrus Mevorach, Curtis R Taylor

Review of Economic Studies · 11.09.2026

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag101 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 11.09.2026. Verfasst von Brett Green und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study how supply disruptions interact with monopoly pricing, inventory management, and consumer stockpiling in a continuous-time model. Pre-emption incentives—consumers prefer to stock up before a price hike while the firm prefers to hike before consumers stock up—lead to an equilibrium with gradual stockpiling and endogenous uncertainty over the timing of a price hike, which can trigger a run at the disruption onset. Consumer storage introduces welfare losses from randomized pricing, but can also strengthen the firm’s incentive to hold buffer stock. Rationing, price controls, and reserve mandates can each improve welfare, but only strategic government reserves can implement the social optimum.

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APA

Green, B., Mevorach, C., & Taylor, C. R. (2026). Stockups, Stockouts, and the Role for Strategic Reserves. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag101

Vancouver

Green B, Mevorach C, Taylor CR. Stockups, Stockouts, and the Role for Strategic Reserves. Review of Economic Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/restud/rdag101

BibTeX
@article{Green2026,
  author = {Green, Brett and Mevorach, Cyrus and Taylor, Curtis R},
  title = {Stockups, Stockouts, and the Role for Strategic Reserves},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdag101}
}
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