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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Market Segmentation Through Information

Matthew Elliott, Andrea Galeotti, Andrew Koh, Wenhao Li

Review of Economic Studies · 17.06.2026

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag067 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 17.06.2026. Verfasst von Matthew Elliott und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: European Research Council, University of Cambridge.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We explore the power that precise information about consumers’ preferences grants an intermediary in shaping competition. We think of an intermediary as an information designer who chooses what information to reveal to firms, which then compete à la Bertrand in a differentiated product market. We analyse the information designs that maximize consumer and producer surplus and uncover systematic differences in how information can be used to intensify or soften competition. Our analysis demonstrates the power that users’ data can endow intermediaries with and speaks directly to current regulatory debates regarding digital marketplaces.

Förderung

  • European Research Council
  • University of Cambridge

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APA

Elliott, M., Galeotti, A., Koh, A., & Li, W. (2026). Market Segmentation Through Information. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag067

Vancouver

Elliott M, Galeotti A, Koh A, Li W. Market Segmentation Through Information. Review of Economic Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/restud/rdag067

BibTeX
@article{Elliott2026,
  author = {Elliott, Matthew and Galeotti, Andrea and Koh, Andrew and Li, Wenhao},
  title = {Market Segmentation Through Information},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdag067}
}
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