Open Rule Legislative Bargaining
Review of Economic Studies · 12.05.2026
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag038 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 12.05.2026. Verfasst von Volker Britz und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 25 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The seminal paper by Baron and Ferejohn (1989, “Bargaining in Legislatures”, American Political Science Review, 83, 1181–1206) leaves significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. We aim to fill these gaps by providing a fresh analysis of open rule bargaining. Our approach relies on an appealing class of stationary equilibria. In this class, we show that delays tend to be longer and allocations tend to be less egalitarian than originally predicted by Baron and Ferejohn. Our results shed new light on the efficiency and fairness implications of using an open vs. closed rule in legislatures and of bargaining processes in general.
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APA
Britz, V., & Gersbach, H. (2026). Open Rule Legislative Bargaining. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag038
Vancouver
Britz V, Gersbach H. Open Rule Legislative Bargaining. Review of Economic Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/restud/rdag038
BibTeX
@article{Britz2026,
author = {Britz, Volker and Gersbach, Hans},
title = {Open Rule Legislative Bargaining},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/restud/rdag038}
}
EUVIMED