EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

A Q-Theory of Banks

Juliane Begenau, Saki Bigio, Jeremy Majerovitz, Matias Vieyra

Review of Economic Studies · 13.01.2026 · 93 (1) · 106-143

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf035 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 09.06.2025. Verfasst von Juliane Begenau und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 77 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitieren

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Bank capital requirements are based on book values, which are slow to reflect losses. In this article, we develop a dynamic model of banks to study the interaction of regulation and delayed accounting. Our model explains four stylized facts: book and market values diverge during crises, the market-to-book ratio predicts future profitability, book leverage constraints rarely bind strictly even as market leverage fans out during crises, and banks delever gradually after net-worth shocks. We show how delayed accounting can allow the regulator to achieve better outcomes than immediate (mark-to-market) accounting. In an estimated version of the model, the optimal regulation couples faster loan-loss recognition with a modest relaxation of the book leverage constraint.

Zitieren

APA

Begenau, J., Bigio, S., Majerovitz, J., & Vieyra, M. (2026). A Q-Theory of Banks. Review of Economic Studies, 93(1), 106-143. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf035

Vancouver

Begenau J, Bigio S, Majerovitz J, Vieyra M. A Q-Theory of Banks. Review of Economic Studies. 2026;93(1):106-143. doi:10.1093/restud/rdaf035

BibTeX
@article{Begenau2026,
  author = {Begenau, Juliane and Bigio, Saki and Majerovitz, Jeremy and Vieyra, Matias},
  title = {A Q-Theory of Banks},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {93},
  number = {1},
  pages = {106--143},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdaf035}
}
Kostenlos starten →