Colluding Against Environmental Regulation
Review of Economic Studies · 13.01.2026 · 93 (1) · 35-71
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf024 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 28.04.2025. Verfasst von Jorge Alé-Chilet und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by € 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.
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APA
Alé-Chilet, J., Chen, C., Li, J., & Reynaert, M. (2026). Colluding Against Environmental Regulation. Review of Economic Studies, 93(1), 35-71. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaf024
Vancouver
Alé-Chilet J, Chen C, Li J, Reynaert M. Colluding Against Environmental Regulation. Review of Economic Studies. 2026;93(1):35-71. doi:10.1093/restud/rdaf024
BibTeX
@article{AlChilet2026,
author = {Alé-Chilet, Jorge and Chen, Cuicui and Li, Jing and Reynaert, Mathias},
title = {Colluding Against Environmental Regulation},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {93},
number = {1},
pages = {35--71},
doi = {10.1093/restud/rdaf024}
}
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