Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance
Review of Economic Studies · 09.05.2025 · 92 (3) · 1497-1531
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae079 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 05.09.2024. Verfasst von Christopher Blattman und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 40-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? Often, gangs fill vacuums of official power, suggesting that increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. We show, however, that state and gang rule can be strategic complements. In particular, gangs could minimize seizures and arrests by keeping neighbourhoods orderly and loyal. If true, increasing state presence could increase incentives for gang rule. In Medellín, Colombia, criminal leaders told us they rule to protect drug rents from police. We test gang responses to state presence using a geographic discontinuity. Internal border changes in 1987 assigned blocks to be closer or further from state security for three decades. Gangs exogenously closer to state presence developed more governance over time. They primarily did so in neighbourhoods with the greatest potential drug rents. This suggests new strategies for countering criminal governance.
Zitieren
APA
Blattman, C., Duncan, G., Lessing, B., & Tobón, S. (2025). Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance. Review of Economic Studies, 92(3), 1497-1531. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae079
Vancouver
Blattman C, Duncan G, Lessing B, Tobón S. Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance. Review of Economic Studies. 2025;92(3):1497-1531. doi:10.1093/restud/rdae079
BibTeX
@article{Blattman2025,
author = {Blattman, Christopher and Duncan, Gustavo and Lessing, Benjamin and Tobón, Santiago},
title = {Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = {2025},
volume = {92},
number = {3},
pages = {1497--1531},
doi = {10.1093/restud/rdae079}
}
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