Memory and Markets
Review of Economic Studies · 09.05.2024 · 91 (3) · 1775-1806
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad067 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 27.06.2023. Verfasst von Sergey Kovbasyuk und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 40 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In many environments, including credit and online markets, records about participants are collected, published, and erased after some time. We study the effects of erasing past records in a dynamic market where the quality of sellers follows a Markov process, and buyers leave feedback about sellers to an information intermediary. When the average quality of sellers is low, unlimited records lead to a market breakdown in the long run. We consider the information design problem and characterize information policies that can sustain trade and that maximize social welfare. These policies hide some information from the market in order to foster socially desirable experimentation. We show that these outcomes can be implemented by appropriately deleting past records. Crucially, positive and negative records play opposite roles with different intensities and must have different lengths: negative records must be deleted sufficiently late, and positive ones sufficiently early.
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APA
Kovbasyuk, S., & Spagnolo, G. (2024). Memory and Markets. Review of Economic Studies, 91(3), 1775-1806. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad067
Vancouver
Kovbasyuk S, Spagnolo G. Memory and Markets. Review of Economic Studies. 2024;91(3):1775-1806. doi:10.1093/restud/rdad067
BibTeX
@article{Kovbasyuk2024,
author = {Kovbasyuk, Sergey and Spagnolo, Giancarlo},
title = {Memory and Markets},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {91},
number = {3},
pages = {1775--1806},
doi = {10.1093/restud/rdad067}
}
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