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Dynamic Asset-Backed Security Design

Emre Ozdenoren, Kathy Yuan, Shengxing Zhang

Review of Economic Studies · 08.11.2023 · 90 (6) · 3282-3314

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad022 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economic Studies, online erschienen am 11.03.2023. Verfasst von Emre Ozdenoren und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Borrowers obtain liquidity by issuing securities backed by the current period payoff and resale price of a long-lived collateral asset, and they are privately informed about the payoff distribution. Asset price can be self-fulfilling: a higher asset price lowers adverse selection and allows borrowers to raise greater funding, which makes the asset more valuable, leading to multiple equilibria. Optimal security design eliminates multiple equilibria, improves welfare, and can be implemented as a repo contract. Persistent adverse selection lowers debt funding, generates volatility in asset prices, and exacerbates credit crunches. The theory demonstrates the role of asset-backed securities on stability of market-based financial systems.

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APA

Ozdenoren, E., Yuan, K., & Zhang, S. (2023). Dynamic Asset-Backed Security Design. Review of Economic Studies, 90(6), 3282-3314. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad022

Vancouver

Ozdenoren E, Yuan K, Zhang S. Dynamic Asset-Backed Security Design. Review of Economic Studies. 2023;90(6):3282-3314. doi:10.1093/restud/rdad022

BibTeX
@article{Ozdenoren2023,
  author = {Ozdenoren, Emre and Yuan, Kathy and Zhang, Shengxing},
  title = {Dynamic Asset-Backed Security Design},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {90},
  number = {6},
  pages = {3282--3314},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdad022}
}
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