Insurer Capital and Organizational Forms in Market Equilibrium
Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 16.11.2026
DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfag034 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Ajay Subramanian und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We explain the coexistence of stock and mutual organizational forms and their relative dominance in different insurance markets in a market equilibrium model. Organizational forms endogenously reflect the benefits and costs of equity and the impact of insurer operating efficiencies. Stock insurers are larger and more efficient than mutual insurers. Mutualization (i) increases with taxes and agency costs, (ii) decreases with the mean and idiosyncratic variability of insuree losses, (iii) increases with aggregate insurer asset and liability risks, and (iv) increases (decreases) with the market return when insuree loss variance is low (high). Evidence from U.S. insurance data supports all our predictions. (JEL G12, G22, G32)
Zitieren
APA
Subramanian, A., & Wang, J. (2026). Insurer Capital and Organizational Forms in Market Equilibrium. Review of Corporate Finance Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfag034
Vancouver
Subramanian A, Wang J. Insurer Capital and Organizational Forms in Market Equilibrium. Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfag034
BibTeX
@article{Subramanian2026,
author = {Subramanian, Ajay and Wang, Jinjing},
title = {Insurer Capital and Organizational Forms in Market Equilibrium},
journal = {Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfag034}
}
EUVIMED