The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 01.08.2026 · 15 (3) · 704-747
DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfag015 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 09.06.2026. Verfasst von Itzhak Ben-David und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 54 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We argue that the effective price of investing in hedge funds far exceeds the headline fee rate of “2-and-20.” In a large 22-year sample of hedge funds, we find that 60% of the gains on which incentive fees are paid are eventually offset by losses. As a result, the effective incentive fee rate is 50% vis-à-vis the nominal 20% rate. The tendency of investors and managers to disinvest capital after negative returns contributes to this phenomenon by causing the crystallization of underwater fees and net losses as well as by eroding the protection intended by the high-water mark provision. (JEL D24, G11, G23, J33)Received: April 17, 2025Editor: J. Anthony CooksonAuthors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Zitieren
APA
Ben-David, I., Birru, J., & Rossi, A. (2026). The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 15(3), 704-747. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfag015
Vancouver
Ben-David I, Birru J, Rossi A. The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2026;15(3):704-747. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfag015
BibTeX
@article{BenDavid2026,
author = {Ben-David, Itzhak and Birru, Justin and Rossi, Andrea},
title = {The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees},
journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {3},
pages = {704--747},
doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfag015}
}
EUVIMED