Selectivity, Favoritism, and Performance: The Role of Investment Consultants in Private Equity
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 22.04.2026
DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfag014 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 22.04.2026. Verfasst von Jose Vicente Martinez und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine the influence of consultants on the portfolio choices and performance of institutional asset owners’ private equity (PE) investments. We find that asset owners using the same search consultant make similar investment choices. Asset owners advised by consultants that focus on a narrower list of PE managers perform better. Among asset owners that share a consultant, those with the largest PE mandates (top clients) end up with better-performing investments. For mechanisms underlying consultants’ performance impact, we find evidence for both access and selection abilities. (JEL G11, G20, G23)
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APA
Martinez, J. V., & Qian, Y. (2026). Selectivity, Favoritism, and Performance: The Role of Investment Consultants in Private Equity. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfag014
Vancouver
Martinez JV, Qian Y. Selectivity, Favoritism, and Performance: The Role of Investment Consultants in Private Equity. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfag014
BibTeX
@article{Martinez2026,
author = {Martinez, Jose Vicente and Qian, Yiming},
title = {Selectivity, Favoritism, and Performance: The Role of Investment Consultants in Private Equity},
journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfag014}
}
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