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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Subsidiary Financing: Risk Shifting as a Commitment Device

Gyöngyi Lóránth, Alan D Morrison, Jing Zeng

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 26.03.2026

DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfag005 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 26.03.2026. Verfasst von Gyöngyi Lóránth und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study how firms can design their organizational structures to overcome dynamic commitment problems when entering new markets. A manager exerts costly effort to first develop and subsequently manage an investment opportunity. Ex post, the firm underinvests in projects that generate high management rents. However, the prospect of those rents helps offset the manager’s initial project development cost, making ex ante commitment to invest optimal. Levered subsidiaries mitigate this time-consistency problem by introducing risk-shifting incentives that counteract underinvestment. Subsidiaries are most valuable for projects that are costly to develop, have moderate management costs, and yield returns uncorrelated with existing business. (JEL G32, G34, L22)

Zitieren

APA

Lóránth, G., Morrison, A. D., & Zeng, J. (2026). Subsidiary Financing: Risk Shifting as a Commitment Device. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfag005

Vancouver

Lóránth G, Morrison AD, Zeng J. Subsidiary Financing: Risk Shifting as a Commitment Device. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfag005

BibTeX
@article{Lrnth2026,
  author = {Lóránth, Gyöngyi and Morrison, Alan D and Zeng, Jing},
  title = {Subsidiary Financing: Risk Shifting as a Commitment Device},
  journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfag005}
}
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