Bank Competition and Bargaining over Refinancing
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 01.05.2026 · 15 (2) · 392-426
DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfaf002 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 11.02.2025. Verfasst von Marina Emiris und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We model mortgage refinancing as a bargaining game involving the borrowing household, the incumbent lender, and outside banks. We show that bargaining can provide a competitive advantage to the incumbent bank. In equilibrium, the borrower’s ability to refinance depends on the incumbent bank’s cost (dis)advantage relative to locally present competing banks and on the average creditworthiness of borrowers in the relevant market. It is also driven by borrower impatience and switching costs. We find empirical support for the key predictions of our model in an administrative data set covering the universe of mortgages in Belgium. (JEL G11, G21, G51)
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APA
Emiris, M., Koulischer, F., & Spaenjers, C. (2026). Bank Competition and Bargaining over Refinancing. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 15(2), 392-426. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaf002
Vancouver
Emiris M, Koulischer F, Spaenjers C. Bank Competition and Bargaining over Refinancing. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2026;15(2):392-426. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfaf002
BibTeX
@article{Emiris2026,
author = {Emiris, Marina and Koulischer, François and Spaenjers, Christophe},
title = {Bank Competition and Bargaining over Refinancing},
journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {392--426},
doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfaf002}
}
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