EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Passivity on the Board of Directors

Chris Yung

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 18.01.2023 · 12 (1) · 170-190

DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfac012 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 14.03.2022. Verfasst von Chris Yung. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 18 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.

Zitieren

APA

Yung, C. (2023). Passivity on the Board of Directors. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 12(1), 170-190. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfac012

Vancouver

Yung C. Passivity on the Board of Directors. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2023;12(1):170-190. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfac012

BibTeX
@article{Yung2023,
  author = {Yung, Chris},
  title = {Passivity on the Board of Directors},
  journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {12},
  number = {1},
  pages = {170--190},
  doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfac012}
}
Kostenlos starten →