Passivity on the Board of Directors
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 18.01.2023 · 12 (1) · 170-190
DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfac012 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 14.03.2022. Verfasst von Chris Yung. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 18 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A CEO proposes a strategic plan to a board of directors acting in an advisory role. Each director supports the plan, opposes it, or delays speaking until other directors act. The option to delay suppresses dissent from bad plans in equilibrium. Delay has a pronounced impact for important decisions and for firms with reputable CEOs who make few errors. I investigate the role of ordering, that is, when directors should be invited to speak as a function of their signal precision.
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APA
Yung, C. (2023). Passivity on the Board of Directors. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 12(1), 170-190. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfac012
Vancouver
Yung C. Passivity on the Board of Directors. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2023;12(1):170-190. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfac012
BibTeX
@article{Yung2023,
author = {Yung, Chris},
title = {Passivity on the Board of Directors},
journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {12},
number = {1},
pages = {170--190},
doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfac012}
}
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