P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 18.04.2022 · 11 (2) · 213-262
DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfab026 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, online erschienen am 08.12.2021. Verfasst von Calebe de Roure und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 112-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We test these predictions against data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates that P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks. (JEL G21)
Zitieren
APA
Roure, C. D., Pelizzon, L., & Thakor, A. (2022). P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 11(2), 213-262. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfab026
Vancouver
Roure CD, Pelizzon L, Thakor A. P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2022;11(2):213-262. doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfab026
BibTeX
@article{Roure2022,
author = {Roure, Calebe de and Pelizzon, Loriana and Thakor, Anjan},
title = {P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?},
journal = {The Review of Corporate Finance Studies},
year = {2022},
volume = {11},
number = {2},
pages = {213--262},
doi = {10.1093/rcfs/cfab026}
}
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