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Preferred Clearing and Post-Trade Costs

Behnoud Alizadeh, Marius Zoican

The Review of Asset Pricing Studies · 20.06.2026

DOI: 10.1093/rapstu/raag008 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, online erschienen am 20.06.2026. Verfasst von Behnoud Alizadeh und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 25 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study fee competition between an incumbent and entrant central counterparty (CCP) under two regimes: interoperability (trades clear at each party’s own CCP) and preferred clearing (trades clear at the incumbent unless both counterparties choose otherwise). Preferred clearing creates network effects that force the entrant to undercut aggressively, while the incumbent sustains higher fees. Fee spreads, average trading costs, and industry profits increase under preferred clearing. However, interoperability is costly because linked CCPs must post collateral against cross-CCP exposure. Interoperability improves welfare when link costs are either low or high enough that the incumbent drops fees to reduce clearing fragmentation. (JEL G11, G12, G14)

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APA

Alizadeh, B., & Zoican, M. (2026). Preferred Clearing and Post-Trade Costs. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rapstu/raag008

Vancouver

Alizadeh B, Zoican M. Preferred Clearing and Post-Trade Costs. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/rapstu/raag008

BibTeX
@article{Alizadeh2026,
  author = {Alizadeh, Behnoud and Zoican, Marius},
  title = {Preferred Clearing and Post-Trade Costs},
  journal = {The Review of Asset Pricing Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/rapstu/raag008}
}
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