International Reserve Management Under Rollover Crises
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 11.07.2026 · 141 (3) · 2269-2311
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjag025 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Quarterly Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 12.05.2026. Verfasst von Mauricio Barbosa-Alves und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article investigates how a government should manage international reserves when it faces the risk of a rollover crisis. We ask: Should the government accumulate reserves or reduce debt to make itself less vulnerable? We show that the optimal policy entails initially reducing debt, followed by a subsequent increase in both debt and reserves as the government approaches a safe zone. Furthermore, we find that issuing additional debt to accumulate reserves can lead to a reduction in sovereign spreads. Evidence from a panel of emerging economies is consistent with these predictions: increases in reserves financed by public external borrowing are associated with lower spreads, and reserve holdings are not systematically drawn down during crisis episodes.
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APA
Barbosa-Alves, M., Bianchi, J., & Sosa-Padilla, C. (2026). International Reserve Management Under Rollover Crises. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 141(3), 2269-2311. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjag025
Vancouver
Barbosa-Alves M, Bianchi J, Sosa-Padilla C. International Reserve Management Under Rollover Crises. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2026;141(3):2269-2311. doi:10.1093/qje/qjag025
BibTeX
@article{BarbosaAlves2026,
author = {Barbosa-Alves, Mauricio and Bianchi, Javier and Sosa-Padilla, César},
title = {International Reserve Management Under Rollover Crises},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {141},
number = {3},
pages = {2269--2311},
doi = {10.1093/qje/qjag025}
}
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