Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 26.09.2023 · 138 (4) · 2451-2503
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjad023 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Quarterly Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 27.05.2023. Verfasst von Giulia Brancaccio und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 32-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Science Foundation, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Princeton University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We explore efficiency and optimal policy in decentralized transport markets, such as taxis, trucks, and bulk shipping. We show that in these markets, search frictions distort the transportation network and the dynamic allocation of carriers over space. We derive explicit and intuitive conditions for efficiency and show how they translate into efficient pricing rules, or optimal taxes and subsidies for the planner who cannot set prices directly. The results imply that destination-based pricing is essential to attain efficiency. Then, using data from dry bulk shipping, we demonstrate that search frictions lead to a sizable social loss and substantial misallocation of ships over space. Optimal policy can eliminate about half of the welfare loss. Can a centralizing platform, often arising as a market-based solution to search frictions, do better? Interestingly, the answer is no; although the platform eradicates frictions, it exerts market power, thus eroding the welfare gains. Finally, we use two recent interventions in the industry (China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the environmental initiative IMO 2020) to demonstrate that taking into account the efficiency properties of transport markets is germane to any proposed policy.
Förderung
- National Science Foundation
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
- Princeton University
Zitieren
APA
Brancaccio, G., Kalouptsidi, M., Papageorgiou, T., & Rosaia, N. (2023). Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 138(4), 2451-2503. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad023
Vancouver
Brancaccio G, Kalouptsidi M, Papageorgiou T, Rosaia N. Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2023;138(4):2451-2503. doi:10.1093/qje/qjad023
BibTeX
@article{Brancaccio2023,
author = {Brancaccio, Giulia and Kalouptsidi, Myrto and Papageorgiou, Theodore and Rosaia, Nicola},
title = {Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {138},
number = {4},
pages = {2451--2503},
doi = {10.1093/qje/qjad023}
}
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