Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?
The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 03.04.2023 · 138 (2) · 1001-1065
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjac040 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Quarterly Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 13.10.2022. Verfasst von Peter Ganong und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 83-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 83 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
There are three prevailing theories of mortgage default: strategic default (driven by negative equity), cash flow default (driven by negative life events), and double-trigger default (where both negative triggers are necessary). It has been difficult to compare these theories in part because negative life events are measured with error. We address this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic-default motive. Our central finding is that only 6% of underwater defaults are caused exclusively by negative equity, an order of magnitude lower than previously thought. We then analyze the remaining defaults. We find that 70% are driven solely by negative life events (i.e., cash flow defaults), while 24% are driven by the interaction between negative life events and negative equity (i.e., double-trigger defaults). Together, the results provide a full decomposition of the theories underlying borrower default and suggest that negative life events play a central role.
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APA
Ganong, P., & Noel, P. (2023). Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 138(2), 1001-1065. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac040
Vancouver
Ganong P, Noel P. Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2023;138(2):1001-1065. doi:10.1093/qje/qjac040
BibTeX
@article{Ganong2023,
author = {Ganong, Peter and Noel, Pascal},
title = {Why do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {138},
number = {2},
pages = {1001--1065},
doi = {10.1093/qje/qjac040}
}
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