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Crossref

Federal ESEA Waivers as Reform Leverage: Politics and Variation in State Implementation

Kenneth K. Wong

Publius: The Journal of Federalism · 2015-07 · 45 (3) · 405-426

DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjv020 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Publius: The Journal of Federalism, online erschienen am 01.05.2015. Verfasst von Kenneth K. Wong. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 24-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 39 Literaturangaben.

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APA

Wong, K. K. (2015). Federal ESEA Waivers as Reform Leverage: Politics and Variation in State Implementation. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 45(3), 405-426. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjv020

Vancouver

Wong KK. Federal ESEA Waivers as Reform Leverage: Politics and Variation in State Implementation. Publius: The Journal of Federalism. 2015;45(3):405-426. doi:10.1093/publius/pjv020

BibTeX
@article{Wong2015,
  author = {Wong, Kenneth K.},
  title = {Federal ESEA Waivers as Reform Leverage: Politics and Variation in State Implementation},
  journal = {Publius: The Journal of Federalism},
  year = {2015},
  volume = {45},
  number = {3},
  pages = {405--426},
  doi = {10.1093/publius/pjv020}
}
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