The Elite Politics of War and Peace: A Review Essay
Political Science Quarterly · 18.06.2026 · 141 (2) · 319-331
DOI: 10.1093/psquar/qqag018 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Political Science Quarterly, online erschienen am 21.05.2026. Verfasst von Paul Fritz. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Arguments for democratic advantages in war are rooted mostly in the ability of the voting public to punish leaders for bad decisions. But what if voters don’t matter as much as we think? In The Insiders' Game: How Elites Make War and Peace, Elizabeth N. Saunders demonstrates the advantages elites have over the voting public when it comes to holding leaders to account and how the insiders' game creates a hawkish bias in U.S. decisions on war and peace. By challenging some of the underpinnings of the democratic advantages in war and providing a compelling explanation for the oversupply of U.S. wars, Saunders has written one the most important books on the domestic politics of war in recent years. The book's theoretical and empirical insights also provide an essential guide for understanding current U.S. foreign policy under a seemingly unconstrained president.
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APA
Fritz, P. (2026). The Elite Politics of War and Peace: A Review Essay. Political Science Quarterly, 141(2), 319-331. https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqag018
Vancouver
Fritz P. The Elite Politics of War and Peace: A Review Essay. Political Science Quarterly. 2026;141(2):319-331. doi:10.1093/psquar/qqag018
BibTeX
@article{Fritz2026,
author = {Fritz, Paul},
title = {The Elite Politics of War and Peace: A Review Essay},
journal = {Political Science Quarterly},
year = {2026},
volume = {141},
number = {2},
pages = {319--331},
doi = {10.1093/psquar/qqag018}
}
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